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IS THE MIRANDA CASELAW REALLY
INCONSISTENT? A PROPOSED FIFTH
AMENDMENT SYNTHESIS
Donald Dripps*
In Miranda v. Arizond the Supreme Court held that custodial interrogation amounts to unconstitutional compulsion to be
a witness against oneself, unless the interrogation is preceded by
the famous warnings or "equally effective" measures to reduce
the pressure to confess. Two years later, in a season of rising
crime rates, riots, and assassinations, Congress responded by
adopting Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act. 2 Title II provides that confessions will be admissible in federal courts so long as they were voluntarily made. In other
words, Congress mandated a return to the pre-Miranda voluntariness standard based on due process, rather than the selfincrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Because Congress declined to require any alternative procedures to reduce the compulsion attending custodial questioning, Title II purports to repudiate, rather than to implement,
Miranda. If Miranda is good law, the statute is unconstitutional,
as was long supposed by the Department of Justice, which refused to invoke the statute in federal cases. In the years since
Miranda, however, majority opinions of the Supreme Court have
characterized the Miranda rules as "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution" but as "measures to insure that the
right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected,"3 a
"prophylactic rule." 4

* James A. Levee Professor of Criminal Procedure, University of Minnesota Law
School.
1. 384U.S.436(1966).
2. Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §
3501. In this article the statute will be referred to interchangeably as "Title II" and as "§
3501."
3. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,444 (1974).
4. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,657 (1984).
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The Fourth Circuit's recent decision in United States v.
5
Dickerson relied on the Court's characterization of Miranda as
merely prophylactic to sustain the constitutionality of Title II
and admit a confession made by a suspect who was not warned
of his. As the Justice Department pointed out in a brief supporting the defendant's petition for certiorari,6 however, the
Court's characterization of Miranda as prophylactic collides with
an extensive line of cases reversing state conviction because of
Miranda violations. 7 If Miranda's safeguards are not "themselves required by the Constitution," the Court has no authority
to reverse state convictions on Miranda grounds. Yet the modern Court has gone so far as to hold not only that it can reverse
state convictions, but also that Miranda claims are cognizable in
federal district court on habeas petitions filed by state prisoners.8
The prevailing academic view, one that spans the ideological spectrum, is that the "prophylactic rules" cases are flatly inconsistent with the cases reversing state decisions. 9 The commentators do not agree on how to resolve the tension between
5. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 578 (Dec. 6, 1999).
6. United States v. Dickerson, No. 99-5525, Brief for the United States in Support
of the Petition for Certiorari (November 1999).
7. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486
U.S. 675 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
8. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
9. Sec, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the Law 218 (U. of Michigan Press, 1993) ("The current situation is doctrinally unstable, with two lines of irreconcilable cases coexisting to give the Court a choice between allowing or disallowing the
police to have the necessary tools for effective interrogation."); Martin R. Gardner, Section 1983 Actions Under Miranda: A Critical View of the Right to Avoid Interrogation, 30
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1277, 1291 (1993) ("Harris, Tucker, and Quarles have been roundly
criticized as inconsistent with essential aspects of Miranda.") (footnote omitted); Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 733, 740 (1987) ("Decisions such as Tucker, Quarles,
and Elstad cut the doctrinal heart out of Miranda."); Yale Kamisar, The "Police Practice"
Phases of the Criminal Process and the Three Phases of the Burger Court, in The Burger
Years: Rights and Wrongs in the Supreme Court 1969-1986, at 143, 155 (Herman
Schwartz, ed., Viking, 1987) (Earl Warren, author of Miranda, would be "taken aback"
by the prophylactic rules approach); Leslie A. Lunney, The Erosion of Miranda: Stare
Decisis Consequences, 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 727 (1999) (arguing generally that the
Miranda caselaw is inconsistent and that the justices have been disingenuous in developing it); Irene Merker Rosenberg and Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic
Rule Against Self Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 955,957 n.4 (1988) ("By denying the
constitutional origins of the Miranda warnings and effectively illegitimating them, the
Court has provided a theoretical underpinning for Miranda's ultimate demise."); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 123
("Tucker seems certainly to have laid the groundwork to overrule Miranda.") (footnote
omitted). When the Rosenbergs cite Stone and Grano for the proposition that Tucker
and like cases are inconsistent with Miranda, see Rosenberg and Rosenberg, 63 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. at 956 n.4, there can be no doubt that thoughtful commentators across a wide
spectrum of ideological persuasions suspect the Court of inconsistency.

2000]

SYNTHESIZING MIRANDA CASELA W

21

the state Miranda cases and the prophylactic-rules cases. Proponents of suspects' rights urge an equation of Miranda violations
with pristine compulsion of testimony under a subpoena and an
immunity order. 1 Critics of Miranda suggest overruling that
landmark decision for want of any legitimate constitutional basis.11 The only unanimous point is that the Supreme Court is in
an embarrassing position.
This essay challenges that conventional wisdom about the
Miranda caselaw. At the level of dicta or rationale, there is indeed an embarrassing inconsistency between those opinions
characterizing Miranda as merely prophylactic and those decisions reversing convictions coming out of state courts. The former dicta cannot be squared with the latter holdings. But
American lawyers learn in the first year of law school that holdings count for more than language in the opinions. Dicta matter,
especially from a Court whose every pronouncement is scanned
with care. But holdings matter still more.
At the level of holdings, decisions taking a narrow view of
what constitutes custody or interrogation, or a broad view of
what constitutes a valid waiver of Miranda rights, do not impugn
Miranda's constitutional grounding. Admitting evidence because the police complied with Miranda cannot tell us that
Miranda is not constitutional. 12 All that can be drawn from such
holdings is that the Court's careful scrutiny of state police practices in some of these cases implicitly affirms Miranda's constitutional stature.
Only when the Court has found that the Miranda rules were
violated by the police, but that the evidence so obtained should
nonetheless have been admitted, do the holdings of the cases potentially impugn Miranda's constitutional basis. A careful look
at Miranda's progeny reveals that in only five cases has the
Court held a statement tainted by a Miranda violation never-

10. Sec, e.g., Charles D. Weissclbcrg, Saving Miranda, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 109, 17778 (1998).
II. See, e.g., Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the Law at 199-222 (cited in note 9).
12. For example, in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994), the Court's
opinion described the Miranda right to counsel as constitutionally recommended rather
than required. The Davis holding that invocation must be unequivocal, however, is simply an interpretation of Miranda, not a decision admitting evidence obtained in violation
of the Miranda safeguards. Similarly, in Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987),
the Court characterized Edwards and Miranda as "prophylactic," but the Barrett holding
that the suspect's refusal to make a written statement did not taint his oral admissions is
like the holding in Davis, an interpretation of, rather than a departure from, Miranda. '

22

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 17:19

theless admissible in evidence. The five cases, in chronological
order, are:
13
(1) Harris v. New York, holding that a statement obtained
from an unwamed suspect may be used to impeach his testimony
at trial;
4
(2) Michigan v. Tucker/ holding that the constitution does
not require suppressing the testimony of a third-party witness
whose identity came to the attention of the police as a result of
questioning a suspect who had invoked the right to counsel in response to the Miranda warning;
(3) Oregon v. Hass, 15 holding that the Harris impeachment
exception applies to post-invocation statements as well as to unwamed statements;
(4) New York v. Quarles, 16 holding that questioning without
warnings, in an emergency situation, falls within a public safety
exception to Miranda;
7
(5) Oregon v. Elstad/ holding that an otherwise valid
waiver of Miranda rights is not necessarily tainted by a previous
admission made in response to custodial interrogation without
the required warnings.
My thesis is that these results can, in the main, be squared
with Miranda. Consistency might require overruling Hass, but
reasonable lawyers might disagree about even that much. The
conventional wisdom is quite correct in describing the legal theory of Tucker, Elstad and Quarles as inconsistent with the legal
theory of Miranda. But it is by no means impossible to construct
legal theories, not articulated by the majority opinions, that can
preserve almost all of the holdings in the Miranda caselaw.
In this essay I adopt the perspective of the law of evidence.
Privileges, whether based on constitutional, statutory, or common-law authority, require procedural rules to regulate the assertion and waiver of the privilege. They require further rules to
define remedies for unauthorized disclosure. This essay argues
that the Miranda case law is either congruent with prevailing
Fifth Amendment privilege jurisprudence or departs from the
general jurisprudence in justifiable ways.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

401 u.s. 222 (1971).
417 u.s. 433 (1974).
420 u.s. 714 (1975).
467 u.s. 649 (1984).
470 u.s. 298 (1985).
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This does not excuse the Court's opinions, which announce
incompatible theories about the application of the privilege in
the context of police interrogations. Nonetheless there is nothing bizarre about opinions going further than the result in the
case at hand. It often falls to the lawyers in subsequent cases to
try and develop a hitherto-unstated rationale or theory that can
justify as much of the existing corpus of precedent as possible.
This essay undertakes that familiar lawyerly project.
The analysis proceeds in three stages. First, I characterize
Miranda itself simply as a special rule governing the waiver of
the Fifth Amendment privilege in the uniquely coercive environment of custodial interrogation. Second, I explain how each
of the five supposedly inconsistent precedents, Hass excepted,
can be squared with the special waiver rule established by
Miranda. Third, I note how a reconciliation of the Miranda
precedents might bear on the Dickerson litigation. I would be
the first to admit that reconsidering Miranda in light of a serious
alternative, such as in-court questioning, might be desirable. But
there is no necessity, rooted in either legal legitimacy or the need
for a coherent body of law, to reconsider Miranda at this time.
I. CHARACTERIZING MIRANDA

The Miranda warning is known to every television viewer in
the country, and the Warren Court's turn to bright-line rules,
founded on the Fifth Amendment rather than the Sixth, has
been well chronicled by other scholars. As a result there is no
need for an extended discussion of Miranda itself. What requires some discussion, and what has received inadequate recognition by scholars and judges, is the way in which Miranda departs from the general law governing the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Viewed from the perspective of privilege law at large, Miranda is nothing more nor less
than a special waiver rule applicable in the unique context of
custodial interrogation.
Historically and throughout the Supreme Court's selfincrimination jurisprudence, the privilege could (and still can) be
claimed during any proceeding. It can be claimed before a grand
8
jury/ before a legislative committee,19 and before an administra-

18.
19.

See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
See, e.g., United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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tive agency. In each of these contexts, the traditional waiver
rule is use it or lose it. The individual must assert the privilege;
answering questions, even when the failure to answer is subject
to the contempt sanction, waives the privilege absent an express
invocation. 21
A citizen protected by the privilege always had the right to
refuse to answer questions put by the police. With the peculiar
exception of the required records cases,22 a citizen is never under
an affirmative legal duty to come forward and confess the commission of a completed crime to the authorities. In other words,
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination secures the
"right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in
the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for such silence." 23 The Court's cases permit drawing rational inferences from refusals to speak, 24 but they forbid stateimposed penalties for exercising the right to remain silent.25
The Miranda opinion took great pains to characterize police
interrogation as a uniquely coercive setting. 26 To this day, that
characterization rings true. The suspect is not free to leave; he
may be in handcuffs, but in any event he will be in the physical
control of armed police. If he attempts to leave, he will be
20. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
21. Sec United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1976) (plurality opinion);
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424,427 (1943); United States ex rei. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927); John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence§ 130 (West, 5th cd. 1999).
22. See, e.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). For modem limitations on
the required-records doctrine, see Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62,67-68 (1968}.
23. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 681 (1998) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 8 (1964)) (omission in original}.
24. Compare Mitchell v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1307 (1999) (Fifth Amendment
prohibits sentencing court from drawing adverse inference from silence), Caner~·. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981) (judge is required to instruct jury not to draw adverse inference from silence if defense requests such an instruction); and Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965) (Fifth Amendment prohibits judicial or prosccutorial comment on defendant's refusal to testify at trial}, with Lachance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262 (1998) (administrative agency may draw adverse inference from silence); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425
U.S. 308 (1976) (prison authorities may draw adverse inference from silence in disciplinary proceedings); and Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (state is permitted to impeach defendant's testimony with prcarrcst silence). Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976),
forbidding impeachment of the criminal defendant's trial testimony by cross-examination
about the refusal to make a statement after police deliver Miranda warnings, rests on the
unfairness of luring the suspect into incriminating silence.
25. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (disqualification from public contracts); Uniformed Sanitation Men Assn. v. Commissioner of Sanitation of the City of New
York, 392 U.S. 280 (1968) (denial of public employment); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967) (denial of public employment).
26. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,457-61 (1966).
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clubbed or shot. The familiar methods of police interrogation
rely on psychological pressure, deception, and manipulation.
They would not be permitted on the cross-examination of any
witness in any judicial proceeding. They would void any contract on the ground of duress and any will on the ground of undue influence.
Miranda's critics deny that every admission by a suspect in
custody is compelled. Fifth Amendment law generally, however,
defines compulsion according to general categories rather than
on a case-by-case, totality-of-the-circumstances approach. For
example, when a grand jury witness negotiates an immunity
agreement through counsel, the immunized testimony may very
well include some statements that the witness would have been
willing to make even without immunity. Yet there is no statement-by-statement inquiry as to which statements were caused
by the threat of contempt. Comment on the defendant's failure
to testify is deemed compulsion,27 without any case-specific inquiry into whether the particular defendant has any reason other
than guilt for standing silent (such as a prior conviction that
would be admitted to impeach).
Miranda deemed custodial interrogation, absent the warnings or similar measures, to constitute compulsion, just as traditional Fifth Amendment law deems questioning under an immunity order compulsion. The judgment struck by Miranda is
entirely consistent with general Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
If, as the Court has held, the denial of public contracts, 28 or
comment on the failure to testify, 29 without more, constitutes
compulsion, custodial interrogation, without more, surely constitutes compulsion as well. Nonetheless, a witness subject to compulsion may, in appropriate circumstances, waive the right to
remain silent.
Before a legislative committee or a grand jury, the suspect
who speaks first and invokes the privilege later may not suppress
his incriminatory admissions.30 His choice to speak was sufficiently unpressured to be characterized, by itself, as a waiver of
the right to remain silent. By contrast, the suspect in custody is
under a different and more intense kind of pressure to speak
27. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
28. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
29. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
30. Indeed, under Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), the witness must not
only refuse to answer but must contemporaneously cite the privilege as the reason for
standing mute.
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rather than stand silent. He is given the Miranda warning to
place him in a position to claim the privilege that is roughly
equivalent to the position of the witness before the grand jury.
What divides Miranda's critics and defenders is whether a special rule for waiving the right to remain silent is constitutionally
required during custodial interrogation, not whether individuals
in custody have a constitutional right to remain silent.31
This is not a question to which we will find a specific answer
in the intentions of the framers, for the modern police force did
not exist until the middle portion of the nineteenth century. Police interrogation as we know it had not supplanted judicial examination of the accused until even later. The assumption that
the framers intended the traditional waiver rule to apply in an
untraditional context can be neither proved nor disproved.
As a matter of first impression, the justification for a proactive rather than reactive waiver rule for police interrogation
makes perfect sense. The idea behind Miranda is that the
warning and the offer of counsel more or less equalize the pressure of police interrogation and the pressure of interrogation before the grand jury under formal process. It follows that once
the warning has been given, the traditional waiver rule is reinstated. Under Davis v. United States/ 2 the suspect must clearly
and unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment rights, just as he
must do before the grand jury.
Why does the suspect hailed before the grand jury not enjoy
the benefit of target warnings similar to the Miranda warnings?
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in United States v. Mandujano
reasoned that police interrogation, although not compelled by
formal process, is as a practical matter more coercive than formal questioning before the grand jury. 33 The grand jury witness
has the opportunity to prepare for questioning and to consult re31. Professor Grano denies that suspects have a "positive right of silence" but admits "a right of silence that exists only in the weak or indirect sense that the person cannot be required or compelled to answer questions." Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the
Law at 44 (cited in note 9) (footnote omitted). Miranda holds that absent the warning
(or something like it) a suspect who is questioned in custody is indeed "required or compelled to answer the questions." See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (the warning "at the time
of interrogation is essential to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual
knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.")
32. 512 u.s. 452 (1994).
33. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 579 (1976) ("[T]he compulsion to
speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or
other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against
intimidation or trickery.") (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461) (brackets original in Mandujano).
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tained counsel prior to questioning, and has little to fear from
brutality or browbeating with a court reporter and twenty three
honest citizens observing the proceedings.
This characterization should help to dispel the idea that
Miranda was ultra vires at the time of decision. The Fifth
Amendment's text says nothing about waiver. The traditional
waiver rule is implied by history, but only within the compass of
familiar forms of questioning. If a suspect on the rack answered
questions without asserting his privilege, the government would
not be heard to argue that the privilege must be claimed and that
answering the questions waives the privilege. Police interrogation is not, except in rare cases of abuse, torture. But it is different enough from traditional questioning under oath to allow the
Court to fashion a different waiver rule to deal with a unique
procedural setting.
Dickerson and prevailing opinion agree that post-Miranda
cases have repudiated Miranda's basis in the Fifth Amendment.
I believe that, while there is plenty of language in subsequent
opinions that casts doubt on Miranda's constitutional status, the
holdings of the cases can be squared with the characterization of
Miranda as a special waiver rule that counts as constitutional law
because the privilege at stake is a constitutional right. This accommodation does not require any bizarre theorizing. None of
the cases to be reconciled will be recharacterized as limited to its
facts on an arcane retroactivity theory. Neither the Third
Amendment nor the Privileges and Immunities Clause will be
called upon for any critical doctrinal work. The analysis, ironically, is entirely conventional in method yet substantially novel
in content.
II. EXPLAINING THE CASES THAT ADMIT EVIDENCE
TAINTED BY MIRANDA VIOLATIONS
A. HARRIS V. NEW YORK
Viven Harris was charged with selling heroin to a New
Rochelle police officer on two occasions, once on January 4 and
34
once on January 7, 1966. On January 7, he was arrested and in34. The discussion of the facts is based on the Supreme Court's opinion in Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In at least one respect the Court's opinion is clearly
wrong. In Harris, the Court says that Harris "makes no claim that the statements made
to the police were coerced or involuntary." If Harris claimed that his statements were
coerced as well as compelled, the case would have had to be remanded for a determina-
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terrogated, without being first apprized of any right to consult
with appointed counsel. From the police standpoint, there was
no reason for such a warning, because Miranda had not yet been
decided. In response to police questions, Harris said he had purchased heroin from a third party at the officer's direction and
with money supplied by the officer.
At trial, the government did not offer the statement into
evidence, so no hearing was held on its admissibility. Instead,
the officer testified that Harris had sold him heroin on January 4
and 6. The petitioner took the stand and testified that he had
sold nothing to the officer on the fourth, and only baking powder
on the sixth. On cross-examination, the prosecutor, over defense
objections, read the transcript of what Harris had said during
the police questioning, and asked Harris if he remembered
making the statements.
The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the Constitution permitted impeachment with statements obtained in violation of Miranda. The Miranda opinion had spoken to this issue
and indicated that statements obtained without the required
warning and waiver could not be used for impeachment.35
Moreover, unlike evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment condemns compelled selfincriminating testimony only when it might be used at a later
trial of the witness. Thus the use in evidence seems to constitute
a second violation of the Fifth Amendment, independent of the
compulsion to speak in the first instance.
The Supreme Court nevertheless ruled that Miranda-tainted
statements may be admitted to impeach. Chief Justice Burger's
opinion reasoned that the passage from Miranda condemning
use of unwarned statements for impeachment "was not at all
necessary to the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as con-

tion of the coercion issue. Id. at 224. In fact, Harris did raise the coercion claim. See
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), Appendix at 57 (defense counsel states to trial
judge that, to use statement to impeach, prosecution "has to show that it was voluntarily
made, under the law, and in conformity with the requirements as set up in the case of
Miranda v. Arizona"). The petition for certiorari clearly sets up the due process claim,
independently of the Miranda claim. See Harris, Petition for Certiorari at 10. See also
Alan M. Dershowitz and John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 Yale L.J. 1198, 1199
(1971) (charging the majority with "at best, gross negligence" concerning the record).
The charge is harsh, but my own review of the record indicates that the charge is substantially justified.
35. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476-77.
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trolling." 36 Given the government's substantial interest in preventing perjury,37 exclusion from the government case in chief
would suffice to deter future Miranda violations, for the police
cannot know in advance whether there will be a trial or whether
the defendant will testify if there is one.38 Thus Harris may be
justified as a trivial exception warranted by a compelling government interest.
The problem with that explanation is that the Harris majority would not permit any use, for impeachment or otherwise, of a
statement they regarded as genuinely compelled, whether by
overbearing interrogation methods or b,y the threat of a con3
tempt sanction. In Mincey v. Arizona the Court held that
statements obtained in violation of Miranda could not be used to
impeach the defendant's testimony when those statements also
ran afoul of the due process voluntariness test. All four justices
in the Harris majority still serving joined the majority opinion.
And in New Jersey v. Portash 40 Justice Stewart wrote a majority
opinion, joined by Justice White, holding that testimony compelled under a grant of immunity might not be used even to impeach the testimony of the immunized witness at his subsequent
criminal trial. 41
How can we reconcile Harris with Miranda on the one hand
and with Portash and Mincey on the other? I suggest two possible distinctions. The first rests on a waiver theory, and the second rests on the theory that statements admitted only to impeach are not testimonial.
1. The Waiver Theory
One possible distinction rests on a waiver theory. In general Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, the criminal defendant's
decision to take the stand and testify in his own defense waives
the privilege with respect to cross-examination questions fairly
36. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224.
37. Sec id. at 225 n.2: "If, for example, an accused confessed fully to a homicide and
led the police to the body of the victim under circumstances making his confession inadmissible, the petitioner would have us allow that accused to take the stand and blandly
deny every fact disclosed to the police or discovered as a 'fruit' of his confession, free
from confrontation with his prior statements and acts."
38. See id. at 225.
39. 437 u.s. 385 (1978).
40. 440 u.s. 450 (1979).
41. Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented on a procedural
ground. See id. at 463 (Biackmun, J., dissenting). But neither of these two members of
the Harris majority hinted that the Ponash Court had reached the wrong result.
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raised by the direct testimony. There is no right to claim the
privilege in response to such valid cross-examination questions,
although it is unclear whether a defendant who did so could be
43
held in contempt. The judge can instruct the jury that the defendant has no privilege in this context. Contempt is probably
unnecessary; the jury will draw devastating inferences from
hearing the questions asked and hearing the privilege claimed in
reply.
It follows that the cross-examination of Harris about his
unwamed statement did not violate his privilege against being
made a witness against himself at the trial, for by taking the
stand and testifying contrary to the prior statement Harris
waived his privilege against the use of the previously compelled
admission. Suppose a bank robbery defendant takes the stand at
trial and testifies "I had nothing to do with this, I was home with
my wife at the time of the robbery." On cross the prosecutor
would be allowed to ask "Isn't it true that you drove the getaway
car?" If the defendant indeed drove the car he would be obliged
to admit this; at any rate he could not successfully assert the
privilege in response to the question.
Thus the defendant who testifies accepts the obligation to
answer truthfully the prosecutor's questions on cross. The answers are not compelled because he had the alternative of not
testifying, reinforced by an instruction to the jury to draw no inference of guilt from standing silent. When a previously compelled statement is excluded from the government's case-inchief, the defendant faces the same choice.
While this provides a partial reconciliation of the cases, it
does not completely erase the potential constitutional injury to
the defendant. Questioning the suspect in custody without a
valid Miranda waiver violates the privilege even if the answers
are never used in evidence. The police have no authority to
grant immunity, and questioning cruel at the time cannot be
44
made uncruel retroactively. As far back as Marbury v. Madison
42. See Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 285-88; Brown v.
United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1958); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1896);
United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1985); Strong, McCormick on Evidence§ 129 (cited in note 21 ).
43. See Strong, McCormick on Evidence§ 129 (cited in note 21).
44. The logic of this argument is supported by the following: If the privilege is not violated until incriminating admissions are introduced into evidence against their declarant at a
criminal trial, exclusion ex post, rather than immunity ex ante, would satisfy constitutional
requirements. The government would not need to obtain a court order guaranteeing immunity
before holding the witness who refuses to answer in contempt.
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the Supreme Court ruled that a witness who claims the privilege
need not disclose incriminating facts subject to future suppression, but can, absent immunitX, refuse to answer questions calling for incriminating answers. 5 A few years later, Chief Justice
Marshall, sitting as the trial judge in United States v. Burr, ruled
that Burr's secretary could be compelled to testify about a code
used in a letter sent by Burr, but only because knowledge of the
code, which might have been acquired after the letter was sent,
was not incriminating.46 In neither Marbury nor Burr did Chief
Justice Marshall invoke the Fifth Amendment; but at least to Joseph Story, the common-law and constitutional privileges were
coextensive.47 The claim that actual use of compelled declarations against the declarant at a criminal trial is essential to any
violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege runs counter to
founding-era practice.
If use of the evidence against the witness at a criminal trial
were necessary to show a constitutional violation, a suspect tortured into confessing would have no Fifth Amendment based
civil remedy if the government chose not to use the fruits at his
trial. Yet the Fifth Amendment privilege was intended partly as
an anti-torture provision. 48 Likewise the suspect could be sworn
to the oath ex officio so long as the answers were not ultimately
used against him, when the privilege was intended partly to ban
fishing-expedition interrogations under oath. 49
The best interpretation recognizes that coercive questioning
with the object of ultimate incrimination violates the privilege,
45. The Marbury Court heard evidence as the trier of fact and sustained Levi Lincoln's claim of privilege, even though Lincoln was not on trial. The Court did not compel
him to answer with the assurance of future exclusion. Sec Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 144 (1803).
46. Sec In Re Willie, 25 F. Cas. 38 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14692E).
47. See Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 662-63 (John E. Nowak
and Ronald D. Rotunda eds., Carolina Academic Press, 1987).
48. See id.
49. The classic contributions on the role of the oath ex officio in the development of
the Fifth Amendment privilege are John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of
Evidence in Trials at Common Law§ 2250 (Little, Brown, 1st cd. 1904), and Leonard W.
Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment (Oxford U. Press, 1968). Recent historical scholarship has challenged the Wigmorc-Levy view by (1) identifying European sources for
the privilege and by (2) pointing out that the privilege was rarely honored in early
American criminal practice, which was characterized by self-representation. These objections do not undermine the claim that the founders respected claims of privilege when
they were raised, or that they did so in large measure because of hostility to the procedure
before the Star Chamber and the High Commission. For the revisionist scholarship, sec
R.H. Helmholz, ed., The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Origins and Development (U. of Chicago Press, 1997). For a tart rejoinder, see Leonard W. Levy, Origins of
the Fifth Amendment and Its Critics, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 821 (1997).
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and that use of the evidence constitutes a separate and distinct
violation. 50 When, as in Harris, the accused waives the objection
to the use of the evidence at trial by waiving his privilege with
respect to cross-examination within the scope of direct, the second violation drops from view. The pretrial violation needs to
be deterred, but the scope of the deterrent remedy is fairly subject to policy-based qualifications just as is the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. The constitutional concern is what happened in the interrogation room, not what happened at the trial.
It therefore made a certain amount of sense for the Harris majority to pattern the Miranda remedy on the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule.
The obvious policy reason to qualify the Miranda exclusionary rule is to discourage and discredit perjury. This is a more
pressing consideration in the Harris situation than in the Portash
situation. The witness who swears to two inconsistent stories can
be convicted of perjury by introducing both statements, proving
both material, and leaving the jury to infer that one or the other
must have been made with knowing falsity. 51 Admissions to the
police are not sworn; the inconsistent-sworn-statements method
of proof will therefore not be available in a subsequent perjury
prosecution. The government needs to prove the trial testimony
false and the pretrial admission true beyond reasonable doubt,
together with the defendant's scienter. The perjury penalty
alone is therefore a far more reassuring check on false testimony
in Portash than in Harris.
On the other hand, when the constitutional wrong to be deterred is flagrant and odious, tolerating perjury may be a lesser
evil than rewarding police brutality. In the Mincey case the police persistently disregarded the suspect's pitiful handwritten
notes refusing to make a statement and requesting counsel, even
though they knew that the wounded prisoner was incoherent and
in considerable pain. 52 Typically statements obtained by such
50. See Stone, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 139-40 (cited in note 9).
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) (1994). Immunized testimony may be used against the
witness in a subsequent perjury prosecution even when the government does not claim
the testimony was false or that it constitutes the corpus delicti. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 121-32 (1980). Nor can a witness claim the privilege on account of
the risk that his statements might be used against him in a prosecution for a crime he
might commit in the future. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1971). It follows that the government can rely on § 1623(c) even when the jury might conclude that
the immunized testimony was true and subsequent testimony, without immunity, was
false. See United States v. Bomski, 125 F.3d 1115,1119 (7th Cir.1997).
52. Detective Hust questioned Mincey for nearly four hours in the intensive care
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methods will not be trustworthy enough to be considered even
for impeachment purposes. But even if they are thought reliable
in a particular case, the need to deter the more extreme forms of
police misconduct justifies a strict exclusionary rule in the coerced confessions cases.
Why, then, bar impeachment use of statements compelled
before the grand jury under an immunity grant? The accused
waived the objection to use at trial by taking the stand and covering the ground of the prior testimony in his trial testimony on
direct examination. The prior questioning under the immunity
grant was entirely legal. The questions asked before the grand
jury are the very questions the prosecutor will put to the accused
on cross-examination, and which the accused has no privilege to
refuse to answer.
Nonetheless, as Justice Holmes remarked in a different context, the law must keep its promises. The government has a constitutional obligation to honor plea agreements. 53 Of greater
relevance, when the government warns the suspect of the right
to remain silent, Doyle v. Ohio 54 holds that it is fundamentally
unfair to use post-warning silence for impeachment purposes.
When the government undertakes to make no use of the witness's testimony in any future prosecution, and then does just
that, a similar unfairness might well be perceived. Again, as in
Mincey, it may be that giving the criminal defendant a chance at
successful perjury is a lesser evil than rewarding official duplicity.
Exclusion in Portash is supported by more than a generalized obligation of governmental trustworthiness. Had the Court
allowed the impeachment in Portash, witnesses given use immunity in future cases would face the cruel trilemma. They would
know that their answers might indeed incriminate them in a future trial at which they might testify and be impeached. Honest
answers might therefore incriminate, dishonest ones would constitute perjury, and silence would be punished by contempt given
the immunity order. The Portash result is necessary to maintain
the integrity of the immunity procedure. By contrast, if exclu-

unit, despite repeated requests for counsel. Mincey, who was nearly comatose upon admission, could not speak because of a tube in his throat and complained of "unbearable"
pain. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 397-401.
53. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
54. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
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sion from the case-in-chief satisfies deterrence, the Harris result
does not compromise the integrity of the Miranda rules.
Pretrial questioning by the police takes place immediately
after arrest, in an uncertain and fluid context. The police typically have hopes of obtaining an admissible confession by complying with Miranda, and they have little to gain by illegally
questioning the suspect for the prize of keeping him off the stand
at a future trial. There may be no future trial; most cases are either dismissed or end in guilty pleas. In any event excluding
Miranda-tainted statements from the case-in-chief gives the police good reason to give the warnings and hope for the waiver
that most suspects actually make in response.
By contrast, the prosecution can invoke the immunity procedure at the close of its investigation. Indeed there is no constitutional barrier to immunizing the defendant before a grand jury
during a continuance given after the close of the prosecution's
case at trial. With nothing to lose by granting immunity, the
government could immunize every defendant on a routine basis.
Those questioned would know that they faced a new trilemma:
contempt, perjury, or practically forfeiting the constitutional
right to testify at the coming trial.
An innocent defendant faces no such problem; he will tell
the same story when immunized and when not immunized.
Those comfortable with government duplicity and inclined to
characterize the right to testify unimpeached as a right to commit perjury may conclude that Portash should be reconsidered.
But the waiver theory can distinguish Harris from Miranda.
2. The Nontestimonial Evidence Theory
The waiver theory offers one way to distinguish Harris and
Miranda. There is another possibility as well. Technically, the
statement offered to impeach in Harris was not offered for truth,
55
but only to prove that the witness was unworthy of belief. The
trial court instructed the jury to consider the prior statements
only as they bore on credibility. If the jury followed the instruction, the evidence would not have been, strictly speaking, testimonial. It could be taken only as proof that the accused told different stories at different times, not that the story told out of
55. The trial judge so instructed the jury, although counsel discussed the substance
of the prior statements. See Harris, 401 U.S. at 223. The constitutional taint is the only
reason for the limiting instruction, as the admissions of the defendant are admissible
against him notwithstanding the hearsay rule.

2000]

SYNTHESIZING MIRANDA CASELA W

35

court was true and could be the basis for conviction. So used,
the evidence, although verbal, would be no more testimonial
56
than a compelled voice exemplar.
There is the standing risk that the jury will not, or even cannot, follow the instruction. Sometimes the Court finds this risk
so extreme that the instruction will not save a conviction from
constitutional attack. In other cases, however, the jury is presumed to follow the instruction even though that seems unlikely
as a matter of fact. For example, the Court's confrontation
clause cases sometimes accept, and sometimes reject, the adequacy of a limiting instruction.57
Reasonable judges could accept the effectiveness of the instruction in the Harris context but reject it in the Mincey and
Portash cases. A jury might well be more prone to use sworn,
immunized statements as proof of guilt as distinct from incredibility. Untruthful answers to the grand jury could lead to a perjury charge, while a suspect might be manipulated or tricked into
a false statement during police interrogation. A coerced confession lies at the other end of the reliability spectrum. The risk
that the jury might use it for truth is therefore more disturbing
56. To be testimonial, the defendant's statement "must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information." Doe v. United States ("Doe IF'),
487 U.S. 201,210 (1988). In Harris the jury was instructed to disregard any factual assertion contained in the tainted statements. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
In Muniz the prosecution introduced a videotape of the DUI defendant, visibly intoxicated, answering booking questions about his physical description, address, and so on.
Five justices (three of whom have left the Court) concluded that the evidence was testimonial, but within a booking exception to Miranda. Four justices (one of whom has left
the Court) concluded that the answers to these questions were not testimonial in the first
place. Because it was the delivery, not the content, of the answers to the booking questions that incriminated Muniz, I think it is better to accept the dissent's characterization
of the evidence as nontestimonial. If the majority view is thought sounder, then Muniz
becomes a case like Quarles, Perkins, and Berkemer, in which the suspect is in custody
and is interrogated, but the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation is nonetheless
absent. See notes 82-85 infra and accompanying text
57. Compare Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (limiting instruction inadequate to preserve defendant's confrontation clause rights when confession of nontestifying codefendant is admitted at joint trial) with Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200
(1987) (where confession is redacted to avoid direct reference to nonconfessing codefendant, limiting instruction is adequate to protect confrontation clause rights), and Tennes·
see v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) (where A's confession is introduced to rebut B's claim
that reading A's confession to B by the police during interrogation coerced B into false
confession, limiting instruction is adequate to protect confrontation clause rights). For
other cases in which the presumption that the jury follows the instructions was necessary
to sustain the constitutionality of a conviction, see Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987)
(no Doyle violation when court sustained defendant's objection and instructed jury to
disregard improper question); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (instruction to disregard improper closing argument held adequate to prevent due process violation).
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than the specter of similar use of a statement obtained after a defective Fifth Amendment waiver.
In Harris, there is a greater risk of perjury with impunity
than in Portash. In Mincey the original constitutional violation
was grave and flagrant, and the need for deterrence at its maximum. Fair-minded judges could conclude that the curative instruction provided all the remedy required in Harris, but not in
Portash or Mincey.
The arguments that a testifying defendant waives the application of the privilege at trial, and that impeachment use of prior
statements is not testimonial, although independent, add to each
other's force. The defendant who takes the stand has no privilege with respect to the substance of the prior statements; the
questions asked by the police in interrogation could be asked by
the prosecutor on cross. The jury will be instructed, nonetheless,
not to use the statements for truth but only as they bear on
credibility. Reasonable judges might have decided Harris the
other way, but the result in Harris does not call Miranda into
question.
B. OREGON V. HASS
The second case in which the Supreme Court has approved
the admission of a statement tainted by a Miranda violation is
Oregon v. Hass. 58 After receiving Miranda warnings, Hass asked
for a lawyer. The police, however, continued questioning, and
the answers Hass gave were admitted at his trial to impeach his
testimony. Hass, unlike Harris, actually asserted his right to
terminate questioning under Miranda. In such a case, the police
have nothing to lose by questioning illegally; the impeachment
exception gives them a positive incentive to do so. Nonetheless,
in Hass the Burger Court again dismissed this ~ncentive effect as
9
"speculative" and permitted the impeachment.'
Hass is far closer to Portash than to Harris. The suspect
who receives Miranda warnings and invokes the right to counsel
invokes his Fifth Amendment rights just as he might before a
grand jury or a legislative committee. Faced with a valid claim
of Fifth Amendment privilege before the grand jury, the prosecutor may not badger the witness but must instead resort to the
immunity procedure. Moreover, unlike the case of the un58.
59.

420 U.S. 714 (1975).
Id. at 723.
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warned suspect, from whom the police may hope to obtain fully
admissible statements after a valid Miranda waiver, the police
have little incentive to cease questioning a suspect who invokes
in response to the warnings. The chance that the suspect may
spontaneously initiate conversation about the case, thereby
opening the door to new warnings and a valid waiver, is slight.
Civil liability is a chimera. 60
Two subsequent developments have undermined the reasoning in Hass. One is a factual development, the other legal.
The factual development is the apparent willingness of the police to question after express invocation for the purpose of obtaining impeachment material. The Hass opinion described this
prospect as "speculative." Current research suggests that
. has come true. ~
specuIatiOn
The legal development is the Court's vigorous enforcement
of the bar on reinterrofation of suspects who invoke the right to
counsel. In Edwards,6 Roberson, 63 and Minnick64 the Court has
rejected emphatically government pleas for permission to reinterrogate after invocation. The distinction between Edwards
and Mosle/ 5 is that the suspect who claims the right to silence
keeps his own counsel, while the suspect who invokes the right
to counsel admits that he is out of his depth. 66 The suspect who
admits he can't handle interrogation after the warning surely
can't handle interrogation that persists in the face of invocation.
He surely doesn't understand the distinction between impeachment and the case in chief. His answers are more likely to be the

60. The majority of courts hold that Miranda claims do not support an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sec Gardner, 30 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 1294-97 (cited in note 9). Even
if they did, and even if the plaintiff could overcome the defendant's qualified immunity,
in typical cases damages would be too low to justify the cost of suit. The suspect is by
hypothesis lawfully arrested and so cannot claim damages attributable to confinement
alone.
61. See Weissclberg, 84 Cornell L. Rev. at 153-62 (cited in note 10).
62. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (suspect who invokes Miranda may
not validly waive Miranda rights if police, rather than the suspect, initiate discussion of
the case).
63. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (suspect who invokes Miranda right
to counsel may not validly waive Miranda rights absent initiation of discussion by suspect
even if post-invocation questioning concerns a different offense).
64. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153 (suspect who invokes Miranda right to counsel may
not validly waive Miranda rights, absent initiation by suspect, even after consulting with
counsel).
65. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (suspect who invokes right to silence,
rather than right to counsel, may make valid waiver if rewarned by police after a break in
the action).
66. See id. at 110 n.2 (White, J ., concurring).
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confused or frightened replies that may shed false if any light on
the truth of inconsistent trial testimony.
The only significant distinction between Hass and Portash is
that a subsequent perjury prosecution offers a more efficacious
remedy for false trial testimony in the Portash context than in
the Hass context. If the Court, following the theory that taking
the stand at trial waives the objection to the introduction of the
previously compelled testimony, were to overrule Portash, Hass
could be maintained. If the Court reached the same result by
following the theory that prior inconsistent statements offered to
impeach are not testimonial, Hass could likewise be maintained.
If, however, the justices were to reaffirm Portash, the greater
credibility of a perjury prosecution when the pretrial statements
are sworn is a genuine but modest distinction. My own view is
that Hass and Portash are irreconcilable, but that this is the only
instance of a really serious conflict in the Miranda caselaw. Hass
predates both Portash and Edwards; any inconsistency is accordingly not chargeable to the Hass majority. It could certainly
be dealt with by holding, in an appropriate future case, that
Portash, Edwards, Roberson and Minnick effectively repudiated
Hass.
C. MICHIGAN V. TUCKER

Tucker was arrested for rape a few months before the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda. 61 The police advised him of
the right to silence and to counsel, but did not advise him of his
right to have counsel appointed if he were indigent. Tucker told
the police he understood the rights they had told him about and
made a statement to the effect that he had been with one
Henderson at the time of the rape. When police interviewed
Henderson, he told police that Tucker had left his company
early enough to have committed the crime. Henderson also told
the police that he had seen Tucker the next day with scratches
on his face and that Tucker had made some incriminating statements at that time.
The trial court suppressed Tucker's statements but not
Henderson's testimony. The Michigan courts affirmed the conviction, but a federal district judge granted Tucker's petition for
habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, but

67. The facts of the case are drawn from the Supreme Court's opinion in Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Henderson's testimony was admissible.
Tucker is thought to be incompatible with Kastigar v. United
States, 68 which upheld the constitutionality of use-plus-fruits immunity. The Kastigar opinion clearly indicates that immunity
would not be constitutional if evidence derived from compelled
testimony were admissible. From the tension with Kastigar and
the Tucker opinion's characterization of the Miranda rules as
prophylactic safeguards, one might conclude that the Court has
called Miranda's constitutional foundation into question.
Kastigar, however, can be squared with Tucker. There is a
tremendous difference between the deliberate pace of an investigation run by the prosecutor's office and the haste and uncer69
In the former context, the
tainty of a police investigation.
prosecutors have the great luxury of deferring immunized testimony until the conclusion of their other investigative work, enabling them to lay out their independent evidence in the application for an immunity order. There will be no question at trial
whether the government had an independent source for all the
evidence described before the immunized testimony was given.
Police interrogation presents a very different situation.
Once the accused appears in court and defense counsel is either
retained or appointed, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
will attach and ordinarily prohibit further questioning. The time
frame within which the police may question the suspect under
the Miranda rules is measured in hours. If a tainted statement
leads police to other evidence, the prosecution will have much
more difficulty proving inevitable discovery or independent
source than is encountered by prosecutors proceeding under an
immunity statute.
This problem is especially acute when the derivative evidence is a human being, who might well have come forward vol70
untarily at any time. The Tucker opinion nowhere suggests that
68. 406 u.s. 441 (1972).
69. See id at 471 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's point was that transactional immunity could fairly be required in the context of immunity orders but not of
police investigations, but the distinction remains valid even when we compare usc immunity grants with police investigations.
70. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 280 (1978) ("Obviously no mathematical weight can be assigned to any of the factors which we have discussed, but just as
obviously they all point to the conclusion that the exclusionary rule should be invoked
with much greater reluctance where the claim is based on a causal relationship between a
constitutional violation and the discovery of a live witness than when a similar claim is
advanced to support suppression of an inanimate object.")
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any and all evidence derived from a Miranda violation is admissible. Quite the contrary; Justice Rehnquist's opinion emphasized the good faith of the police as a reason to admit the evidence.71 Clearly a case in which the police persisted in
questioning a suspect who had invoked his rights, with the conscious object of learning the location of incriminating physical
evidence, would present a very different case.
The best reading of Tucker is that the defendant bears the
burden of proving that the government obtained the derivative
evidence by exploiting the Miranda violation, and could not have
discovered the evidence otherwise. This is the reverse of the
rule in Kastigar; the government must prove that evidence is not
derived from immunized testimony. The difference between
police interrogation and grand jury investigations, however,
could justify a different assignment of the burden of proof. In
many cases the police either had an independent source or
would have inevitably discovered the derivative evidence, but
this cannot be proved as easily in the police interrogation as in
the grand jury context.
On this reading Miranda violations are still constitutional
violations. The Fifth Amendment requires use-plus-fruits immunity in Kastigar cases and use-plus-fruits exclusion in Miranda
cases. The only difference is a defensible procedural one on who
bears the burden of proof.

D.

0REGONV. ELSTAD

Elstad was suspected of burglary and arrested at his home in
72
the presence of his mother. Without giving Miranda warnings
the police questioned him briefly, and he admitted that he had
been present at the scene during the crime. An hour later, at the
police station, Elstad received the Miranda warnings, waived,
and made a written confession. The Oregon courts suppressed
both the initial admission and the subsequent confession.
The Supreme Court reversed. The opinion rejects the analogy to Fourth Amendment fruits analysis in the context of successive admissions, but it does not hold that evidence derived
from a Miranda violation is automatically admissible. The Ore71. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447 ("We consider it significant to our decision in this case that the officers' failure to advise respondent of his right to appointed
counsel occurred prior to the decision in Miranda.").
72. The facts are taken from the Supreme Court's opinion in Oregon v. Elstad, 470
u.s. 298 (1985).
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gon court had in effect presumed that a tainted statement made
a subsequent voluntary statement impossible for an extended
period of time. 73 Then-Associate-Justice Rehnquist wrote for
the majority that "[w]e hold today that a suspect who has once
responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not
thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he
74
has been given the requisite Miranda warnings. "
Whether an unwarned admission in fact undermines the
voluntariness of a subsequent Miranda waiver is a question of
fact. "As in any such inquiry, the finder of fact must examine
the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police
conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the voluntariness of his statements."75 There was no evidence in Elstad that
the police exploited the admission or otherwise pressured the
suspect into waiving his rights at the station.
The only potential difficulty is that Elstad might be inconsistent with both Kastigar and the due process cases in which one
coerced confession is a factor tending to show that a subsequent
statement was also coerced. 76 If fact, there is no real tension with
Kastigar. Suppose a witness testifies before a grand jury under a
grant of immunity. As soon as she leaves the grand jury room,
she is arrested. If the police administer good Miranda warnings,
and she signs a waiver card and makes incriminating admissions,
Kastigar requires suppression only if the government fails to
prove that the statements to the police were obtained independently of the immunized testimony. That inquiry turns out to be
precisely the inquiry into voluntariness of the Miranda waiver
required by Elstad. In other words, if the police exploited the
immunized testimony to get the statements, Elstad agrees with
Kastigar in requiring suppression.
Nor is there any irreconcilable inconsistency between Elstad
and the coerced confession cases. Even in the coerced confession cases the Court sometimes held a subsequent statement
admissible.n Presumably, the causal influence of coercion per73. See State v. Elstad, 658 P.2d 552,554 (Ct. App. Or. 1983), rev'd sub nom Oregon
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
74. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.
75. Id
76. On the tension with the coerced confession cases, see id. at 324-28 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
77. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) (second confession, given twelve
hours after initial coerced confession, held voluntary). Sec also United States v. Baver,
331 U.S. 532 (1947) (second confession, obtained after initial conversation tainted by
McNabb violation and possible coerced, held voluntary).
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sists after that of a Miranda violation has dissipated. Likewise
the law is justifiably more eager to deter coercive questioning
than to enforce Miranda's special waiver rule. Bringing Bentham up to date a bit, a question is not a stun gun.
Just as in Tucker, Elstad is best read as a burden of proof
decision. If the suspect makes an unwarned admission, is later
given good warnings and executes a waiver, the burden is on the
defense to show that the initial police questioning coerced the
suspect into the waiver. This burden will rarely be met, but it
could be in appropriate cases. Suppose, for example, that in the
Elstad case the police had said: "Look, kid, you gave it up already, you might as well tell us the whole story." Whether the
evidentiary force of police exploitation would overcome the fact
that the suspect knew his rights and signed them away is a very
different question than that presented in Elstad.

E. NEWYORKV. QUARLES
Quarles was arrested for rape, after a chase, in the back of a
supermarket. One of the arresting officers frisked him immediately after his surrender and found an empty shoulder holster.
With the suspect in handcuffs but not yet warned, the officer
asked where the gun was. Quarles indicated where he had left it.
The Supreme Court held that the statement and the gun were
admissible pursuant to a public safety exception to Miranda.
Quarles is easy to reconcile with Miranda. Although Quarles was clearly in custody and clearly questioned, there is more
to custodial interrogation than the bare technical coincidence of
custody and a question. Miranda's concern was with secret stationhouse questioning under the complete control of the police.
As Professor Yeager has persuasively argued, the evil of custodial interrogation is synthetic even though the law treats custody
and interrogation as analytically distinct elements that must coexist before Miranda comes into play.78 Quarles was asked one
question, in public, in the immediate aftermath of the chase.
That the Court recognized an exception to Miranda only when
an urgent threat to public safety was added to these facts shows
just how strong the Court's commitment to Miranda's bright-line
rules really is.

78. See Daniel Yeager, Rethinking Custodial interrogation, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1
(1991).
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A persuasive analogy exists between Quarles and decisions
finding no custodial interrogation even though the suspect was in
9
custody and was interrogation. In Berkemer v. McCarty/ the
Court, per Justice Marshall, held that questioning motorists
stopped for traffic infractions does not trigger Miranda's safeguards. In Illinois v. Perkins 80 the Court held that a prison inmate questioned by an informant was not subject to custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. In Quarles, just as
in Perkins and McCarty, it is fair to say that the defendant was
not free to leave and was interrogated, but that the presumptively coercive environment of custodial interrogation was nonetheless absent. If this is so, Quarles is consistent with Miranda.
Ill. THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECONCILING THE
MIRANDA CASES FOR THE DICKERSON LITIGATION

The Dickerson majority is right about at least one thingTitle II of the Ominbus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act is inconsistent with Miranda. Far from accepting the Court's invitation to experiment with alternative safeguards to reduce the coercive pressure of custodial interrogation, Congress simply
demanded a return to the pre-Miranda voluntariness test. 81 If
Miranda is indeed a constitutional decision, then the statute is
unconstitutional.
If the argument presented so far is correct, the Supreme
Court can maintain the constitutional status of Miranda without
calling into question any of its precedents save possibly Oregon
v. Hass. (As previously indicated, although I am not persuaded
that Hass can be saved, there are at least colorable arguments to
the contrary.) By contrast, if the Court were to hold Title II
constitutional and abjure Miranda's constitutional foundations,
the Court would be obliged to overrule every one of its decisions
reversing a state conviction on Miranda grounds.
The Court has no common-law or supervisory power over
criminal justice in the states. To reverse a state conviction the
Court must find a justification in the laws or Constitution of the
United States. It follows that when the Court reverses a state
conviction on Miranda grounds, the Miranda rules must have
constitutional stature, because there are no federal laws, apart
79. 468 U.S.420 (1984).

80. 496 u.s. 292 (1990).
81. § 3501(b) explicitly repudiates Miranda by providing that advising the suspect
of his rights is only one factor to be considered in determining admissibility.
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from the Constitution, that might justify reversal. The Dickerson
court therefore supposes that roughly a dozen decisions of the
Supreme Court must pe flat-out overruled. The holdings in
82

Withrow, Keohane, 83 Muniz,PA Minnick, 85 Roberson, 86 Edwards,'O/
88
91
Smith, Tague, 89 Orozco,'XJ Miranda, Vignera and Stewart92 can-

not be squared with § 3501. Given current Sixth Amendment
law, upholding § 3501 would require throwing out the result in
Escobedo v. Illinoi/ 3 as well.
To be sure, there is plenty of language in the Court's opinions characterizing Miranda as something less than constitutional. Good lawyers, however, quite properly focus on the
holdings of the cases. The holdings in Harris, Tucker, Elstad and
Quarles can all be squared with Miranda and with the Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence at large.

82. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
83. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995) (reversing denial of state prisoner's
petition for federal habeas based on Miranda violation because lower federal courts cr·
roncously presumed state court fact-finding correct).
84. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (holding that state courts should
have excluded DUI suspect's answer ("I don't know") to post-custody, pre-warning question about date of suspect's sixth birthday).
85. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (reversing state court conviction because trial court admitted statements obtained by post-invocation interrogation that followed consultation with counsel).
86. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (affirming state courts' exclusion of
post-invocation statement obtained by questioning undertaken pursuant to separate investigation).
87. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (reversing state court conviction because trial court admitted statements obtained by rcintcrrogating suspect who had invoked Miranda right to counsel).
88. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984) (reversing state court conviction because
trial court admitted statement obtained by interrogation that followed suspect's unequivocal request for counsel).
89. Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980) (reversing state conviction because
state courts found valid Miranda waiver without evidentiary support).
90. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (reversing state conviction because trial
court admitted statements obtained by custodial questioning without required warnings).
91. Vignera v. New York, 384 U.S. 436, 493-94 (a companion case to Miranda, reversing a state conviction for failure to give adequate warnings).
92 California v. Stewan, 384 U.S. 436,497-99 (another companion case to Miranda;
the Court affirmed the state supreme court's reversal of the conviction because the record did not show that warnings were given).
93. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Escobedo asked to sec his lawyer, while his lawyer was
trying to see him, after Escobedo had been arrested but before the filing of formal
charges. Under Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), the Sixth Amendment attaches
only with the filing of formal charges or the initiation of judicial proceedings. Accordingly Escobedo's Sixth Amendment rationale is no longer good Ia~. ~bscnt M~ran~,
the police disregard of Escobedo's request for counsel would not JUSlify cxcludmg h1s
admissions.
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And it is clear that the Court would prefer to maintain its
holdings rather than its dicta. Justice Stewart dissented in
Miranda, but eleven years later he wrote an opinion rebuffing
94
the plea of twenty one states that Miranda be overruled. Justice White wrote a vigorous dissent in Miranda, yet he later
wrote the opinion that did the most to reinvigorate and even expand the scope of the Miranda rules. 95 Justice Harlan dissented
in Miranda but followed Miranda in the Orozco case for reasons
of stare decisis. 96 Chief Justice Burger, the author of Harris and a
bitter dissenter in Williams, wrote that he would "neither over97
rule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date. "
"This late date" was the twelfth of May, 1980. Jimmy Carter was
President of the United States and the Berlin Wall would stand
for nine more years.
If Miranda in particular has gained adherents over time,
constitutional stare decisis in general has assumed greater
prominence since the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. 98 According to the Casey plurality, overruling controver99
sial landmarks under fire is an especially disfavored course. If
that is so, upholding Title II would be suspect even if there were
otherwise a strong case for overruling Miranda. Title II was a
direct repudiation of the Court's decision in Miranda; it was
passed only after a provision stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in confession cases was deleted from the bill by a few
votes in the Senate. 100 If a landmark precedent was ever "under
fire," Miranda was when Congress adopted Title II.

94. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). The Eighth Circuit had set aside
Williams' conviction for the rape and murder of a ten year old girl on Christmas Eve on
Miranda grounds. See Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227, 233 (8th Cir. 1974) (relying on
Miranda). For the submission of the states, sec Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977),
Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement ct al., at 10. Justice
Stewart's opinion for the Court set aside the conviction on Sixth, rather than Fifth,
amendment grounds.
95. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477.
96. Sec Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
97. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,304 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
98. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
99. Sec Casey, 505 U.S. at 867.
100. 9if' Cong., 2d Scss. (May 21, 1968), in Cong. Rcc. 14177. For a general history
of the adoption of the bill, see Adam Carlyle Breckenridge, Congress Against the Court
39-94 (U. of Nebraska Press, 1970). The removal of the more extreme provisions on the
floor of the Senate suggest that even further tempering might have taken place in the
House. But on June 5, Robert Kennedy was assassinated-the second political assassination of the year and the third in five years. The next day the House passed the Senate bill
by voice vote, without calling for a conference. 90thc Cong., 2d Scss. (June 6, 1968), in
Cong. Rec. 16299-300.
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Well-trained lawyers may well wonder at the spectacle of a
circuit court judge, joined by a district court judge sitting by
designation, defying the holdings of a dozen Supreme Court
cases. Well-trained lawyers would expect such judges to make
every possible effort to reconcile perceived inconsistencies in the
Supreme Court precedents before blithely concluding that dicta
deserve more respect than holdings. Certainly many thoughtful
judges and scholars believe that the Miranda caselaw is inconsistent. But before embracing that conclusion a lower court ought
to have labored long and hard to save, rather than to destroy, as
much of the existing law as possible. The failure of the Dickerson opinion to make even the slightest effort in this direction can
only be described as unprofessional.
CONCLUSION
My point is not that the existing caselaw is ideal, only that it
is not dysfunctionally incoherent. Miranda, as the Court has
come to recognize, is a compromise between a free society's
need to protect itself from crime and its abiding respect for individual dignity and autonomy. Some such compromise will always be with us, and many potential alternatives might be better
compromises than the one struck in Miranda.
Those commentators who have pointed out the tension between the prophylactic rules cases and the cases applying
Miranda to the states are by no means incorrect in their assessment of the Court's actual work product. None of the justices
has attempted to reconcile the impeachment cases with the state
Miranda cases, and the majority opinions in Elstad and Tucker
were affirmatively written to call Miranda into question when
this was not necessary to the results. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Harris-one joined by Justice Harlan, of all
people-clearly misread the record in order to reach the
Miranda impeachment issue. 101 There is plenty to criticize in the
Miranda caselaw.
If, however, the issue is whether Miranda is good law, the
answer must be yes. If tensions among precedents and conflicts
expressed in dicta authorize lower courts to depart from Supreme Court precedent, what body of constitutional law is safe?
The Tenth and Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence? The
Commerce Clause jurisprudence? The sexual privacy cases?
I 0 I. See note 34.
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The Takings Clause jurisprudence? The Court works under the
constraints of collective decision theory. 102 Demanding that
every pronouncement in every opinion reflect an identical justifying theory, over decades of decisions in cases that divide good
judges, asks too much. With luck there may be some underlying
logic in the decisions that none of the justices subscribed to as
individuals.
That does not imply that the results in Harris, Hass, Tucker
and Elstad were in any way required by Miranda. It would be
easier-far easier-to square rulings for the defense in these
cases with Miranda than it is to square the actual rulings for the
prosecution. But there is an important difference between the
difficult and the impossible.
What I have offered in this essay are some principled arguments that might explain how Miranda, the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts' Miranda decisions, and general Fifth
Amendment privilege jurisprudence can be reconciled with each
other. I started out thinking that such a reconciliation is impossible. I have become convinced that good lawyers can work
through the Miranda caselaw to find some coherent synthesis,
although I am by no means convinced that my own arguments
are the only or even the best reconciliation that is possible. 103 After all, this essay represents one of the first serious attempt to
reconcile the cases, as opposed to seizing on each line as authority for rejecting the other.
To say that a synthesis is impossible would be to say that the
justices who have enforced Miranda in state court while qualifying the Miranda exclusionary rule generally were indulging in
hypocrisy in the latter cases and in arbitrary power in the former.
The Miranda caselaw contains much to censure. Nonetheless,
102. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802,
811-31 (1982).
I 03. Professor Weisse! berg has suggested a synthesis based on good faith. Sec Weisselberg, 84 Cornell L. Rev. at 184, 188 (cited in note 10). In Harris, Tucker, Hass, and
Elstad the police did not deliberately violate Miranda. His admirable article offers one
illustration of how good lawyers might reconcile the Miranda caselaw. We agree that
Tucker and Elstad should be thought of as exclusionary rule decisions, although I would
shift the burden of proving attenuation while he would focus on good faith. I think it is
much harder to characterize the impeachment decisions as exclusionary rule decisions, at
least without some explanation, such as waiver or nontestimonial evidence, of why receiving a compelled statement at trial does not constitute an independent violation of the
Fifth Amendment privilege. Moreover, I am reluctant to put too much reliance on the
good faith excuse, an excuse which seems to tolerate violations of constitutional rights by
the police with no attendant remedy. See Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale L.J.
906 (1986).
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hypocrisy and usurpation would be unfair charges to level
against the likes of Byron White and Potter Stewart, who
thought their obligation to apply the law as it is at the time of
decision required them both to dissent from decisions they
thought unsound and to follow those decisions once they had
been made. They may have failed to articulate a fully satisfying
theory, but it does not follow that no such theory can be found.

